A framework for evaluating animals as sentinels for infectious disease surveillance by Halliday, Jo E B et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A framework for evaluating animals as sentinels for infectious
disease surveillance
Citation for published version:
Halliday, JEB, Meredith, AL, Knobel, DL, Shaw, DJ, Bronsvoort, M & Cleaveland, S 2007, 'A framework for
evaluating animals as sentinels for infectious disease surveillance' Journal of the Royal Society Interface,
vol. 4, no. 16, pp. 973-84. DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2007.0237
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1098/rsif.2007.0237
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Published In:
Journal of the Royal Society Interface
Publisher Rights Statement:
2007 The Royal Society
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
One contribu
epidemiologic
*Author for c
Received 7 Fe
Accepted 11 AA framework for evaluating animals as
sentinels for infectious disease surveillance
Jo E. B. Halliday*, Anna L. Meredith, Darryn L. Knobel, Darren J. Shaw,
Barend M. de C. Bronsvoort and Sarah Cleaveland
Wildlife and Emerging Diseases Section, R(D)SVS, University of Edinburgh,
Easter Bush Veterinary Centre, Roslin, Midlothian EH25 9RG, UK
The dynamics of infectious diseases are highly variable. Host ranges, host responses to
pathogens and the relationships between hosts are heterogeneous. Here, we argue that the use
of animal sentinels has the potential to use this variation and enable the exploitation of a wide
range of pathogen hosts for surveillance purposes. Animal sentinels may be used to address
many surveillance questions, but they may currently be underused as a surveillance tool and
there is a need for improved interdisciplinary collaboration and communication in order to
fully explore the potential of animal sentinels. In different contexts, different animal hosts
will themselves vary in their capacity to provide useful information. We describe a
conceptual framework within which the characteristics of different host populations and their
potential value as sentinels can be evaluated in a broad range of settings.
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The dynamics of infectious disease systems are inher-
ently variable. The outcome of any infection depends on
multiple factors relating to pathogen characteristics,
host susceptibility, infecting dose and routes of
transmission, all of which can vary widely for any
particular infectious organism. Many of the major
diseases of medical, veterinary and conservation
importance (such as highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
(HPAI), foot-and-mouth disease, bluetongue and
rabies) are caused by pathogens with wide host ranges
(Woolhouse & Gowtage-Sequeria 2005), which intro-
duces further complexity.
While the complex epidemiology of multi-host
pathogens presents considerable challenges for under-
standing infection dynamics and implementing disease
control, heterogeneities in host range and infection
outcome also provide opportunities for disease surveil-
lance. In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework
that can be applied to examine those characteristics of
host populations that inﬂuence their potential value as
sentinels for disease surveillance in different ecological
and epidemiological settings.
Surveillance is deﬁned by the World Health
Organization as ‘the ongoing systematic collection,
collation, analysis and interpretation of data and the
dissemination of information to those who need to
know in order for action to be taken’ (World Health
Organization 2001). The aim of disease surveillance istion of 20 to a Theme Issue ‘Cross-scale inﬂuences on
al dynamics: from genes to ecosystems’.
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status of animal and human populations and is
essential to provide rigorous evidence of the absence
of disease or to determine the prevalence of a
pathogen when present (Salman 2003). A critical
element of surveillance is that an identiﬁed response is
made on the basis of the surveillance data generated
to allow appropriate action to be taken. Sentinel
surveillance is one form of surveillance in which
activities focus on speciﬁc subpopulations to enhance
detection of disease and/or improve the cost-effective-
ness of surveillance (McCluskey 2003). The aim of the
sentinel surveillance is to obtain timely information in
a relatively inexpensive manner rather than to derive
precise estimates of prevalence or incidence in the
general population (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2002). It has long been recognized that
animal populations have the potential to act as
sentinels for environmental health hazards (CAMEH
1991), but, given the importance of domestic and wild
animal hosts in emerging human diseases, it is clear
that surveillance in animals is also critical for under-
standing and managing emerging disease threats
(Kuiken et al. 2005; Woolhouse & Gowtage-Sequeria
2005; Kahn 2006). Animal sentinels almost certainly
represent an important but underused surveillance
tool (Rabinowitz et al. 2005) that may be capable of
accommodating and capitalizing on the variability
that exists in infectious disease processes.
Animal sentinels may potentially be used to address
a range of surveillance questions including (i) detection
of a pathogen in a new area, (ii) detection of changes in
the prevalence or incidence of a pathogen or disease
over time, (iii) determining the rates and direction ofJ. R. Soc. Interface (2007) 4, 973–984
doi:10.1098/rsif.2007.0237Published online 15 May 2007This journal is q 2007 The Royal Society
Table 1. Summary of applications of animal sentinels for environmental and infectious hazards.
type of sentinel example reference
individual animal coal miner’s canary used to detect the presence of
carbon monoxide
Burrell & Seibert (1916); Schwabe (1984)
herd/population sentinel cattle herds and chicken ﬂocks used to
monitor the distribution of arboviruses and their
vectors in Australia and the USA
National Arbovirus Monitoring Program
(2003–2004); Loftin et al. (2006)
same species unvaccinated chickens placed within vaccinated
ﬂock to detect HPAI
Suarez (2005)
different, more
susceptible species
feral pigs released into New Zealand to detect the
presence of bovine TB—more susceptible than
possums; coal miner’s canary (as above)
Nugent et al. (2002)
sentinel application example reference
deliberately placed
(experimental)
standard laboratory mice sentinel programmes
using outbred mice, sacriﬁced and tested to
detect presence of a panel of rodent pathogens in
the core experimental or breeding colony
Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources
(US). Committee on Infectious Diseases of
Mice and Rats (1991)
use of sentinel chickens to evaluate the effectiveness
of cleaning and disinfection procedures for
eradication of Newcastle disease
McCluskey et al. (2006)
in natural habitat
(observational)
wildlife as detectors of DDT and PCB toxicity
evaluation of white-tailed deer as natural
sentinels for Anaplasma phagocytophilum, the
cause of human granulocytic anaplasmosis
CAMEH (1991)
Dugan et al. (2006)
mesothelioma in pet dogs associated with
exposure of their owners to asbestos
Glickman et al. (1983)
sentinel unit equine premises used to investigate presence of
vesicular stomatitis in Colorado
McCluskey et al. (2002)
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the ecology of a pathogen, and (v) evaluating the
efﬁcacy of potential disease control interventions
(McCluskey 2003). The appropriate use of animal
sentinels can facilitate the early detection and identiﬁ-
cation of outbreaks that is of critical importance for the
success of control and prevention efforts (Chomel 2003;
Kahn 2006) and reducing the magnitude of subsequent
outbreaks (Ferguson et al. 2005). However, the
potential of animal sentinel surveillance can only be
realized if the information provided from animal
populations is acted upon. For example, in an Ebola
outbreak in central Africa, few preventive health
measures were taken despite warnings of an imminent
human outbreak being provided from monitoring of
Ebola deaths in primate sentinels (Rouquet et al. 2005).
The term ‘sentinel’ is widely used in both epidemio-
logical and veterinary clinical literature and is implicitly
understood but rarely deﬁned. While all uses invoke the
common concept of standing guard or keeping watch,
existing deﬁnitions tend to be context-speciﬁc. The classic
example of an animal sentinel is that of the coal miner’s
canary. In this case, an individual animal of a different
species is deliberately selected and placed in a situation
where it can provide evidence of increased risk to the
human population on the basis of its greater sensitivity
and obvious observable response to the presence of carbon
monoxide. Since the mid-twentieth century, it has been
recognized that animals can act as important sentinels for
a wide range of environmental health hazards (CAMEH
1991). For example, domestic dogs and the tumours they
develop may facilitate identiﬁcation of environmentalJ. R. Soc. Interface (2007)carcinogens that affect humans (Thrusﬁeld 2005). Senti-
nels can vary from individual animals to herds or larger
populations, from animals of the same species to different,
more susceptible, more expendable or more accessible
species, and from animals deliberately placed or intro-
duced to those already existing in a particular location.
The sentinel concept can also refer to a physical location,
such as a farm, abattoir, veterinary practice or laboratory
(the ‘sentinel unit’) which is selected to monitor a
particular disease (table 1). Throughout this paper, we
use ‘animal sentinels’ as an umbrella term for the topic in
general and ‘sentinel population’ to refer to the unit of
observation in a particular case.
Despite the apparent potential for animal sentinels to
inform decisions about risk to both human and animal
populations, animal sentinels appear underutilized,
particularly in the context of infectious disease surveil-
lance (Rabinowitz et al. 2005), and their value has been
discussed primarily in the context of environmental
health (CAMEH 1991). A basic lack of integration
between disciplines, most noticeably between human
and veterinary medicine and also between different
branches within these ﬁelds, is likely to have contributed
to this underuse of animal sentinels (Rabinowitz et al.
2005). There are currently no standard criteria which are
applied for the evaluation of animal sentinels, limiting the
ease with which data can be transferred between
disciplines (Rabinowitz et al. 2005). The existing
infectious disease literature regarding animal sentinels
consists largely of descriptive studies that have generated
hypotheses regarding animal sentinel use (Rabinowitz
et al. 2005), but as yet includes few studies that were
Box 1. West Nile virus surveillance in North America: animal sentinel case study.
West Nile virus (WNV), an arbovirus of the genus Flaviviridae, is maintained in a mosquito–bird–mosquito cycle
primarily involving Culex sp. mosquitoes (Campbell et al. 2002). Humans and other mammal species are incidental dead-
end hosts. The majority of human infections withWNV are asymptomatic or result in transient febrile illness but in a small
proportion of cases, meningoencephalitis can occur (Mostashari et al. 2001). The geographical range of WNV has
historically included Africa, Europe, Asia and Australia (Campbell et al. 2002). In 1999, the ﬁrst North American cases of
WNVwere reported in New York and since then the virus has spread across the continental United States and into Canada,
Latin America and the Caribbean (Hayes & Gubler 2006). The surveillance of WNV in North America has included
investigation of the utility of different animal sentinels. Some of the ﬁndings of these studies are described below with
reference to the sentinel framework.
Sentinel response to pathogen
A number of North American bird species including corvids, house sparrows, house ﬁnches and grackles are competent
reservoirs for mosquito infection with WNV (Komar et al. 2003). Among these potential sentinel species, corvids and
speciﬁcally American crows (Corvus brachyrhynchos) are particularly susceptible to infection with WNV and have a high
mortality rate (McLean et al. 2001; Komar et al. 2003; Yaremych et al. 2004). In 2000, it was established that dead crow
reports preceded both the conﬁrmation of viral activity (through laboratory analysis) and the onset of human cases by
several months (Eidson et al. 2001b). Subsequent spatial analyses using data collected in New York have identiﬁed a
positive association between the risk of human disease caused byWNV and elevated local dead crow reports in the previous
one to two weeks (Mostashari et al. 2003; Eidson et al. 2005; Johnson et al. 2006). The thorough characterization of this
temporal association ensures that the observation of crow deaths can be acted upon immediately without the need for time-
consuming laboratory analyses. The observation of clusters of high crow mortality can therefore be used to predict human
risk early enough to implement targeted mosquito control and personal protection warnings (Mostashari et al. 2003; Eidson
et al. 2005; Johnson et al. 2006).
Relationship between sentinel and target populations
Domestic dogs have also been evaluated as sentinels of WNV presence (Komar et al. 2001; Kile et al. 2005). This sentinel
choice is informedby the particular relationship that domestic dogs havewith humans,whichmeans that they arewell suited to
act as indicators of the infectious disease risks that their owners are likely to encounter. North American domestic dogs
consistently show higher seroprevalence of anti-WNV antibodies than humans (Komar et al. 2001; Kile et al. 2005) and one
analysis revealed that outdoor dogs were nearly 19 times more likely to have seroconverted toWNV than indoor-only pet dogs
(Kile et al. 2005). The pattern of human exposure to the arthropod vectors ofWNV is likely to bemore similar to that of indoor-
only dogs, but within the context of broad spatial association with humans; this divergence from the human niche means that
outdoor-only dogs are more sensitive sentinels of WNV presence and human risk than indoor-only dogs (Kile et al. 2005).
Transmission route
The role played by differentmosquito species (predominantly of the genusCulex) in the transmission ofWNVbetweenbirds
and to humans is apparently quite variable (Kilpatrick et al. 2005; Molaei et al. 2006). At one study site in Maryland and
Washington DC, over 90% of all Culexmosquitoes identiﬁed were of the species Culex pipiens (Kilpatrick et al. 2006). At this
site, the rise in humanWNV cases that occurs in late summer and early autumn is apparently caused by a marked shift in the
feeding preferences of this vector species from birds to humans (Kilpatrick et al. 2006) that is associated with the dispersal of a
preferred host, the America robin (Turdus migratorius). This temporal variation in vector feeding preferences means that the
transmission ofWNVtobirdhosts (including corvids) occurs earlier in the season than transmission tohumansandexplains the
capacity for bird die-offs to provide an early warning of human risk. A similar shift in feeding patterns associated with a rise in
human cases is also seen in Culex tarsalismosquitoes in Colorado and California (Kilpatrick et al. 2006).
Detectability
Although the pathogenicity of WNV to birds including crows has been demonstrated within the historical geographical
range ofWNV (Work et al. 1955), bird die-offs are not typically associated with humanWNV outbreaks within this historical
geographical rangeand theveryhighmortality seen inAmericancorvidpopulations is apparentlyunusual (Eidsonet al.2001a).
Clearly, this difference may limit the application of corvids as useful sentinels of WNV to contexts within the Americas. Even
within North America, there is variation in the suitability of corvids to act as a sentinel for WNV activity according to the
density of human populations. A study using decoy crows revealed that both detection and reporting rates were lower in rural
areas comparedwithurban areas (Ward et al. 2006). Spatial analyses have also identiﬁed reduced capacity of dead crowdensity
measures to forecast human infections in rural areas (Eidson et al. 2005). These effects are seen because the capacity of crows to
act as useful sentinels dependsupon the likelihood that birddeaths are observedand reportedbypeople.Thepower ofdeadcrow
sentinel surveillance to predict human risk is greatly reduced in rural areas as a consequence of a reduced detectability of the
sentinel response.
Animal sentinel surveillance J. E. B. Halliday et al. 975purposefully designed to evaluate their potential. The
major exception is the extensive research that has been
carried out into the use of animal sentinels in the
surveillance ofWestNile virus (WNV) inNorthAmerica
(see box 1). The utility of different animal sentinel
populations varies enormously according to both the
ecological context and the aim of the surveillance
programme, and in many cases animal sentinels may
not prove a useful surveillance tool.J. R. Soc. Interface (2007)2. IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING ANIMAL
SENTINELS
For any population to be useful for surveillance, it must
be under observation andmust be capable of developing
a detectable response to a particular pathogen. Sentinel
populations are distinguished from other populations
by having attributes that enhance detection of the
disease or of the etiological agent and/or improve the
pathogen
sentinel targetpopulation
transmission
route
sentinel and target
relationship
sentinel response
to pathogen
transmission
route
Figure 1. Key components and attributes of the sentinel
framework.
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most cases, this means that the sentinel population is
more likely to be exposed to, or to respond to the
pathogen than other populations. This sentinel concept
encompasses the variety of uses described above and
can refer to any level of grouping from an individual to a
larger unit, such as a herd or even a species.
Various authors have compiled lists of attributes of an
‘ideal’ sentinel (CAMEH 1991; Komar 2001), but these
have invariably been created with a particular sentinel
application in mind and there exists little or no
consensus about the common characteristics or deﬁning
features of ‘the sentinel’. This ambiguity, of course,
reﬂects the fact that there is no innate quality of sentinel
suitability that particular species or populations have.
Instead, the criteria against which the usefulness of a
given sentinel population is assessed are inﬂuenced by
the aim of surveillance and the context in which the
sentinel would be used. We describe a conceptual
framework which we believe can be used to evaluate
potential sentinel populations for any combination of
surveillance aim and ecological context (ﬁgures 1 and 2).3. THE SENTINEL FRAMEWORK
Within any surveillance context, the sentinel popu-
lation must always interact with both the pathogen and
the target population and it is essential to consider and
describe the interactions between these fundamental
components (ﬁgure 1). The following are the three
components of the sentinel framework.
—Pathogen. The pathogen that is under surveillance.
—Target population. The population of concern to
which information gathered from the sentinel is
applied.
— Sentinel population.
This framework is not intended to represent the
transmission dynamics of a pathogen, but rather the
ways in which the components are associated. Three
critical attributes of this system must be considered in
order to assess the utility of a potential sentinel for a
particular surveillance aim and in any given ecological
context: (i) the sentinel response to the pathogen, (ii)
the relationship between sentinel and target popu-
lations, and (iii) routes of transmission to both target
and sentinel populations. The conceptual issues raisedJ. R. Soc. Interface (2007)are discussed with reference to the surveillance of WNV
in North America (box 1).3.1. Sentinel response to pathogen
The sentinel response to a pathogen can range from the
production of antibody in an otherwise healthy
individual, through morbidity and ultimately to
mortality. It may also be possible to detect the
presence of the pathogen in a sentinel population
before other responses develop and sentinel responses
can therefore include the following.
—Current infection/presence of pathogen.
— Seroconversion.
—Morbidity.
—Mortality.
There is a clear intuitive distinction between sentinel
populations that develop high levels of morbidity or
mortality in response to pathogen exposure and those
that remain healthy. Sick or dying sentinels show an
obvious and dramatic response to a pathogen and
provide a readily appreciable signal of the presence of a
pathogen within an ecosystem (see the discussion of
crow mortality as a sentinel of WNV presence in box 1).
At the other end of the spectrum, apparently healthy
sentinels that develop a subclinical response are often
more useful for investigating the maintenance patterns
and transmission dynamics of a pathogen within the
sentinel and target populations. Following the con-
sumption of prey infected with rabbit haemorrhagic
disease virus (RHDV), foxes in northern Germany
developed antibody responses that declined after just
two weeks. Serosurveillance of this fox population
therefore reveals the proportion of the population that
has been exposed in the one to two weeks prior to
testing. These serological data can provide a good
indication of the incidence patterns of RHDV in the
sympatric rabbit population (Fro¨lich et al. 1998). In
cases in which healthy sentinels are used, it may be
desirable to resample the same individuals or popu-
lations over time. It is also important that the
observation and sampling of the sentinel population,
and perhaps also the sentinel response itself, has
minimal impact upon the study system.
This example also demonstrates the inﬂuence of the
temporal characteristics of the sentinel response to a
pathogen upon the choice and application of sentinel
populations. Sentinel populations which respond to a
pathogen prior to the exposure of the target population
may be useful for those surveillance programmes that aim
toprevent the exposureof the targetpopulation.Forother
sentinel uses, the rapiddevelopment of a responsemaynot
be required. The duration of the potential sentinel’s
response can also inﬂuence the types of questionwhich can
be usefully addressed. An equivalent sentinel population
(to that of the foxes) that developed a longer lasting
antibody response in the above RHDV example would be
of limited use for investigating the incidence of disease in
the rabbit population on this immediate time-scale.
The sentinel response can be viewed as a test for the
presence of the pathogen within the target population
Animal sentinel surveillance J. E. B. Halliday et al. 977and as such has properties that are analogous to test
sensitivity and speciﬁcity.
— Sentinel sensitivity. The sensitivity of the sentinel
refers to its capacity to respond to the presence of the
pathogen in the target population and effectively
translates as susceptibility to infection. An insensi-
tive population would be unlikely to display evidence
of infection with the pathogen even if it were present
in the target population and would therefore be
poorly suited for use as a sentinel.
— Sentinel speciﬁcity. The speciﬁcity of the sentinel
response relates to the ease with which a sentinel
response can be interpreted and attributed to a
particular pathogen. Speciﬁcity is thus closely linked
to the response type. Morbidity and mortality are
generally less speciﬁc indicators of the presence of a
particular pathogen than molecular responses that
are observed using a test or assay unique to the
pathogen in question. Across parts of rural Africa
and Asia, for example, bird die-offs due to pathogens
other than H5N1 avian inﬂuenza virus can be
relatively common occurrences, reducing the speci-
ﬁcity of bird mortality as an indicator of H5N1
presence (World Health Organization 2005).
Whatever the type of response a particular sentinel
population mounts to a pathogen, it is important that
the individual members of that population are consist-
ent in the development of the response. Excessive
variation within a sentinel population would greatly
complicate the interpretation of surveillance ﬁndings
and it may therefore be important to ensure that
members of the sentinel population are of similar age,
sex or other relevant characteristics, depending upon
the type of response measured.3.2. Relationship between sentinel and target
populations
The relationship that exists between the sentinel and
target populations may include behavioural, epidemiolo-
gical or spatial aspects or any other form of ecological
association. Detailed understanding of the associations
between the sentinel and target populations is not
required to address all questions. However, a comprehen-
sive understanding of the relationship between a sentinel
and a target population will allow for the investigation of
more complex epidemiological questions and better-
informed interpretation of the data collected through
surveillance of that sentinel. The minimum association
thatmust exist between a sentinel and a target population
is a spatialassociation.Thisneednot imply spatial overlap
however. If the pathogen is spreading on a wavefront or
emanating from a focal source, then a sentinel population
may be selected on the basis of its closer proximity to the
focus at the target population.
At the other extreme, the sentinel population may
consist of a speciﬁc subset of the target population,
ensuring a very close relationship between the two
populations. A subpopulation that experiences high-
transmission risk, or is particularly sensitive to infec-
tion with a particular pathogen, may serve as a sentinelJ. R. Soc. Interface (2007)for the wider population and can clearly provide a more
accurate assessment of risk to the target than a
population occupying a dissimilar ecological niche and
consequently experiencing a very different pattern of
exposure to the pathogen (e.g. unvaccinated sentinel
birds are used to detect the presence of HPAI viruses
within the otherwise vaccinated ﬂock; Suarez 2005).
The sentinel and target population may also be
epidemiologically linked such that the sentinel may
act as a source of infection for the target population, as
is the case with arthropod vector surveillance.3.3. Transmission routes
This attribute is essentially a component of the relation-
ship between the sentinel and target populations that
explicitly considers the route or routes throughwhich the
two populations can become infected with the pathogen.
In circumstances where the target and sentinel are
exposed to infection via the same route, the relative
intensity and patterns of exposure of the two populations
to the source of infection are important (Estrada-Franco
et al. 2006). It may be desirable to select a sentinel that
has higher levels of exposure and which is therefore more
likely to show evidence of a pathogen if it is present than
to directly survey the target population itself. For
pathogens that are transmitted by a vector or vectors,
the feeding preferences of the vector(s) can therefore be
important in informing sentinel selection. Domestic dogs
are the preferred source of blood meals for Triatoma
infestans, one of the main vectors of Trypanosoma cruzi
in Mexico. A comparative serosurvey revealed overall
anti-T. cruzi IgG prevalence of 16% in dogs compared
with a 2% prevalence in humans, and a strong positive
correlation between human and dog seropositivitywithin
the study area. These data suggest that the feeding
preferences of this vector make the domestic dog
population a good sentinel for identifying areas of
human seropositivity and monitoring prevalence in this
context (Estrada-Franco et al. 2006).
There are also circumstances in which the route of
exposure of the sentinel and target population may
differ. A number of emerging zoonoses, including WNV
and HPAI H5N1 viruses can be transmitted through
the ingestion of infected material (Komar et al. 2003;
Austgen et al. 2004; Rimmelzwaan et al. 2006).
Carnivore and scavenger species that are exposed
through consumption of infected prey may prove useful
sentinels for a wide range of pathogens, speciﬁcally
because of this additional route of exposure that is not
shared with the target population (Cleaveland et al.
2006). A single predator or scavenger typically con-
sumes material from multiple individuals, increasing
the probability of exposure to pathogens circulating
within the prey population. Predators and scavengers
can effectively sample from the prey population,
leading to a ‘bioaccumulation’ effect whereby patho-
gens present at relatively low prevalence in the prey
population may be detected at higher prevalence in the
predator/scavenger species (Cleaveland et al. 2006). An
understanding of the predator–prey relationships
between the target population and potential sentinels
may prove useful in sentinel selection. The principal
surveillance aim
• pathogen
• target population
• sentinel
sentinel frame work
sentinel response
detectability
of response
practical factors host ecology
sentinel utility
• sampling
• diagnostics
• safety and
  welfare
• host visibility
• host behaviour
• sensitivity
• specificity
• current infection
• seroconversion
• morbidity
• mortality
Figure 2. The sentinel framework in context.
978 Animal sentinel surveillance J. E. B. Halliday et al.transmission route of bluetongue virus, which infects
wild and domestic ruminants across East Africa, is via
Culicoides midge vectors. Serosurveillance of free-
ranging African carnivores revealed that both the
seroprevalence and the virus serotype identiﬁed varied
dramatically across carnivore species (Alexander et al.
1994). This study suggested that the most probable
route of infection of carnivores with bluetongue was via
consumption of infected prey, and that the variation
seen between species was attributable to dietary
differences. Different carnivore species may therefore
vary in their utility as sentinels for the presence of
bluetongue virus in different ruminant species.4. PLACING THE SENTINEL FRAMEWORK
IN CONTEXT
The sentinel response can be viewed as the output of the
sentinel framework. The nature of this response, in
combination with other sentinel host factors and
practical inﬂuences which depend upon the context in
which surveillance is conducted, determines the overall
detectability of the sentinel response (ﬁgure 2). Unlike
the attributes which operate within the sentinel frame-
work, detectability is a quality of the interaction
between the sentinel and the observer. The overall
utility of any potential sentinel can only be assessed by
considering both the sentinel framework and the
inﬂuences of the context in which it would be applied
(ﬁgure 2; box 2).
The visibility of any animal population is
determined by the morphology, behaviour, distri-
bution and abundance of the individual animals of
which it is comprised. The detectability of theJ. R. Soc. Interface (2007)sentinel response includes both the visibility of the
animal and its response to a pathogen. The type of
response that an animal mounts will directly affect
the ease with which it is detected by the observer.
For example, lions are being used as sentinels for
canine distemper in the Serengeti National Park in
Tanzania, as a result of their high visibility to
observers and the dramatic manifestations of clinical
disease, which include grand mal seizures (Roelke-
Parker et al. 1996). Information from lion sentinels
would be used to increase disease detection efforts
within other wild carnivore populations of the park
to establish the extent and impact of any epidemic
and initiate a risk–beneﬁt assessment for possible
interventions (such as vaccination) for protecting
threatened wildlife populations. A wide range of
other carnivore species such as hyaenas, bat-eared
foxes and leopards are known to be susceptible to
canine distemper (Roelke-Parker et al. 1996), but are
less suitable as sentinels for disease in the Serengeti
owing to ecological and behavioural factors that reduce
visibility (e.g. nocturnal behaviour, small body size, den-
living characteristics, lower levels of tourist observation).
Widespread morbidity or mortality within a sentinel
population are more readily appreciable than seroconver-
sion or current infection/presence of pathogen, which can
only be detected by the observer after ﬁrst sampling the
sentinel population and then conducting laboratory
analysis. In the case of overt sentinel responses such as
mortality, the existence of a reliable network of
‘observers’ and a mechanism through which data are
reported are crucial. It is equally important to consider
the available capacity to detect any less overt responses
including the existence of a reliable sampling protocol
and a diagnostic test (McCluskey 2003). The majority of
diagnostic tests for human and livestock pathogens have
not been validated for use in non-target species and the
sensitivity and speciﬁcity of tests can vary hugely
between species (Greiner &Gardner 2000). The existence
of a suitable negative control population and recognition
of the time required to identify and validate diagnostic
tests must be considered in any proposed sentinel
surveillance programme.
The practical difﬁculties involved in sampling any
potential sentinel population must also be evaluated
and it may often be difﬁcult to reconcile the use of a
theoretically ideal sentinel with such practicalities.
For a sentinel population to be useful, it must be both
logistically feasible and safe to sample sufﬁcient
numbers of the population (CAMEH 1991). Since
sentinels are often selected on the basis of increased
likelihood of exposure to a pathogen, sentinel surveil-
lance can enable targeting of resources and often has
improved cost-effectiveness as compared, for example,
with more comprehensive cross-sectional surveys
(McCluskey et al. 2003). The bioaccumulation effect
discussed above suggests that evidence of exposure to
a pathogen may effectively accumulate within carni-
vore populations (Cleaveland et al. 2006). The
identiﬁcation of the presence of a pathogen within a
particular area can therefore be achieved by sampling
relatively few carnivore sentinels, as compared to an
exhaustive and costly survey of the prey population
Box 2. Simpliﬁed application of the conceptual framework represented in ﬁgures 1 and 2 to the evaluation of potential
sentinel populations for the surveillance of HPAI H5N1.
Surveillance aim
To establish if H5N1 viruses have been introduced into a country with underdeveloped disease surveillance and reporting
structure.
Should sentinels be used?
— Cross-sectional survey–may be expensive and time consuming.
— Sentinel surveillance–potentially cost-effective alternative
Y
Sentinel framework
pathogenZHPAI H5N1 virus.
target populationZthe national poultry population.
Potential sentinels
—Backyard chicken populations in areas of perceived high risk of virus introduction, e.g. close to areas of wild bird
congregation or to livestock markets.
— Backyard ducks in similar locations.
—Wild bird populations.
— Domestic cats.
— Domestic dogs.
Other potential sentinels are excluded altogether on the basis of a lack of response to the pathogen or of any type of
meaningful relationship with the target population.
Relationship between sentinel and target populations
Chickens
— Subset of target population.
Ducks
—Occupy a very similar niche to target population.
—May act as silent carrier of viruses (Hulse-Post et al. 2005).
Wild birds
—May act as source of infection for domestic species.
—May not occupy the same geographical areas as the target population (especially true for large congregations of
migratory birds).
Cats and dogs
— Spatial correspondence with target population.
— Cats and dogs may prey upon the target population.
Transmission routes
Chickens, ducks and wild birds
— Bird–bird transmission.
— Environmental contamination.
Cats and dogs
— Consumption of infected birds (Keawcharoen et al. 2004; Kuiken et al. 2004).
— Horizontal transmission in cats (Rimmelzwaan et al. 2006).
Y
Sentinel response
Chickens
— Consistent, rapid and widespread mortality.
— Die-offs provide a prompt indication of virus presence.
Ducks
—Variable pathogenicity and thus mortality (Sturm-Ramirez et al. 2005).
— Isolation of virus from healthy birds (Hulse-Post et al. 2005).
Wild birds
— Variable pathogenicity (Ellis et al. 2004).
— Isolation of virus from healthy birds (Chen et al. 2006).
Cats
— Experimental evidence of mortality response (Rimmelzwaan et al. 2006).
—Mortality reports associated with bird die-offs (Butler 2006a, Songserm et al. 2006a, Yingst et al. 2006).
— High seroconversion rates (Butler 2006b).
— Subclinical infections (Leschnik et al. 2007).
Dogs
—High seroconversion rates (Butler 2006b).
—Mortality report associated with bird infection (Songserm et al. 2006b).
Sensitivity and speciﬁcity of responses
Chickens
—### Highly sensitive but speciﬁcity of mortality response is low, as
—!!! chicken die-offs not necessarily unusual where poultry are not routinely vaccinated against other pathogens,
(Continued.)
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e.g. Newcastle disease virus.
—### High speciﬁcity of laboratory analyses.
Ducks
—#/! Variable mortality response limits sensitivity.
—### High speciﬁcity of laboratory analyses.
Wild birds
—#/! Variable mortality response limits sensitivity.
—!!! Very low prevalence in healthy birds limits sensitivity (Chen et al. 2006).
—### High speciﬁcity of laboratory analyses.
Cats and Dogs
—#/! Serological analyses non-speciﬁc for distinguishing high- and low-pathogenicity viruses.
C
Host ecology
—### Domestic species are all highly observable as a consequence of their close association with humans.
—!!!Wild birds are considerably less visible and may occupy relatively remote and inaccessible areas.
C
Practical factors
—Risk to sampling personnel must be considered as a priority when developing all sampling protocols.
—### Domestic species approachable and handleable.
—#/! Distribution of cats and dogs relatively to poultry may vary according to factors such as urbanization and
religion.
—!!! Considerable investment of money, time and expertise required to sample sufﬁcient numbers of wild birds.
—### For the identiﬁcation of virus presence, standard test protocols include RT-PCR and virus isolation (World
Organization for Animal Health 2005) which are generally adaptable across species.
—#/! Serological analyses may not be well developed for wild birds, cats or dogs.
Y
Detectability
Chickens
—### Mortality response easily appreciated.
—### High visibility within human communities.
—!!! Low speciﬁcity of mortality limits detectability.
Ducks
—!!! Mortality response variable.
—### Additional responses detectable through laboratory analysis.
—### High visibility within human communities.
Wild birds
—!!! Mortality response variable.
—!!! Low visibility compared with domestic species.
— Logistically complex and time-consuming sampling required.
Cats and Dogs
—### High visibility within human communities.
—### Sudden and widespread morbidity or mortality uncommon.
—#/! Non-mortality responses less detectable.
In all cases, a comprehensive network of observers is vital and it may be necessary to develop education programmes
aimed at improving reporting levels.
Y
Utility
—Domestic chicken and ducks sentinels are likely to provide the most rapid and dramatic response to HPAI H5N1 virus
within a country. However, in this context in which mortality in domestic birds is not unusual, this mortality may not
be reported and the detectability of the response in the context of this surveillance aim may be very low.
— To best address this surveillance aim, the speciﬁcity of the chicken mortality response to HPAI H5N1 presence could
be enhanced by using a combination of sentinels such that priority was given to the investigation of chicken die-offs
that were accompanied by morbidity or mortality in cats or dogs (Yingst et al. 2006).
— Retrospective analysis of sera collected from ducks, cats and dogs could also be used to identify those areas in which
an H5N1 virus had been present.
Box 2. (Continued.)
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prevalence, thereby providing a relatively rapid and
inexpensive surveillance option (Fro¨lich et al. 1998;
Leighton et al. 2001; Csa´ngo´ et al. 2004; Cleaveland
et al. 2006). In addition to consideration of time and
cost, the potential risks to research personnel and the
public that are associated with the desired sampling
strategy must be evaluated, as well as the effects ofJ. R. Soc. Interface (2007)sampling upon the sentinel population itself in the
context of animal welfare and conservation status
(CAMEH 1991).5. APPLICATIONS OF ANIMAL SENTINELS
Many of the questions addressed through the use of
animal sentinels, such as the assessment of pathogen
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ations over time and the demonstration of the
absence of a pathogen, require only the basic
qualities of a sentinel as deﬁned above. While the
more speciﬁc requirements of any particular sentinel
are unique to the context and aim to which it is
applied, there are some general qualities and sub-
types of sentinels that correspond to major appli-
cations of animal sentinels. For example, sentinels in
which the response to a pathogen and the detection
of that response occur prior to exposure, or cases in
the target population, can provide early warning of
pathogen presence. Early warning sentinels are used
to provide a predictive signal of risk to the target
population. Sentinels that are exposed and which
respond to a pathogen before the exposure of the
target population may provide an opportunity to
implement pre-emptive control measures and to
prevent the infection of the target population (see
discussion of WNV surveillance in box 1). Other
early warning sentinels may respond to the pathogen
more rapidly than the target population but not
necessarily before the target’s exposure (e.g. the coal
miner’s canary). In such cases, data collected from
the sentinel cannot be used to prevent cases in the
target population altogether. However, the infor-
mation they supply can provide advance warning of
cases, enabling the prioritization of resources for
treatment and the prevention of additional cases. In
most cases, early warning sentinels are highly visible
and develop a very obvious response to the pathogen.
Data provided by sentinels with these qualities can
be more rapidly processed, analysed and acted upon
than the data from apparently healthy sentinels for
which the potentially lengthy processes of sample
collection and laboratory analyses must be carried
out before any data are available. Ideally, the
response of early warning sentinels should also be
very speciﬁc to minimize the likelihood of false
positive responses and consequently improve conﬁ-
dence in decision making based on the sentinel
response alone.
Sentinels can also be used retrospectively to
provide evidence of the timing of pathogen introduc-
tion and spread through a target population.
In situations where a number of populations or
locations are sampled, this information can be
combined to reveal the spatial and temporal pattern
of pathogen spread. Following the widespread rinder-
pest outbreak that occurred in Kenya in 1993–1997,
the retrospective serosurveillance of buffalo herds and
analysis of age-seroprevalence patterns allowed the
estimation of the time of infection in different herds,
the identiﬁcation of the probable point of entry of the
pathogen into the wildlife population and the elucida-
tion of where the pathogen had been, how it had
spread and where it was likely to move to (Kock et al.
1999). In this case, buffalo herds were selected as
sentinels on the basis of the increased susceptibility of
the species to this virus (Rossiter 1994), and served as
sentinels for the larger livestock population in the
affected areas. In such circumstances, the appropriate
sentinel population must develop a response to theJ. R. Soc. Interface (2007)pathogen that persists and is detectable a long time
after exposure. When used retrospectively, it is also
important that individuals of the sentinel population
can be reliably aged.6. CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper has been to provide a
consistent and inclusive framework that clariﬁes our
understanding of the role of animal sentinels and their
potential value in the surveillance of human and animal
infectious diseases, as well as providing a conceptual
tool that can be applied to assess and characterize
potential sentinels in the future. At present, surveil-
lance of many pathogens involves the target population
alone; however, the broad host range of many
important human and animal diseases provides oppor-
tunities for exploiting a wide range of species for
surveillance purposes. The variability of host responses
to a pathogen, the heterogeneities in pathogen exposure
in different populations and the differing relationships
between sentinel and target populations indicate that
different animal hosts will themselves vary in their
ability to act as effective sentinels in different
circumstances.
Animal sentinels may not serve as a useful surveil-
lance tool in all contexts. The generic framework that
we have developed in this paper describes the attributes
of host species that need to be considered to identify
appropriate sentinel populations for different surveil-
lance purposes. This same framework should also be
used to identify characteristics of potential sentinels
that perhaps make them unsuitable in a particular
circumstance. For example, sentinels must by
deﬁnition be intentionally observed. This classiﬁcation
distinguishes the use of animal sentinels from scenarios
in which responses of animal populations to novel
pathogens are ‘noticed’. For this reason, animal
sentinels cannot provide the solution to the question
of how to carry out surveillance for pathogens that are
currently unknown. However, as a consequence of
greater awareness of the potential of animal sentinels
and improved observation of animal populations,
instances of unusual morbidity and mortality in animal
populations that result from the emergence of novel
pathogens would perhaps be more likely to be noticed
and their potential signiﬁcance to other species
recognized.
To date, there has been limited appreciation of the
data resource that different animal hosts represent
for disease surveillance. This paper aims to highlight
the variety of surveillance functions for which animal
sentinels may be used, the range of animal host
species that may usefully be exploited (particularly
for human disease surveillance) and the potential
beneﬁts of animal sentinels for enhanced pathogen
detection and improved cost-effectiveness of surveil-
lance. The potential value of animal sentinels in
disease prevention and control can only be realized
with close integration and effective communication
between and within human and animal health
sectors; information generated from sentinel popu-
lations must be disseminated to those who need to
982 Animal sentinel surveillance J. E. B. Halliday et al.take action, and appropriate responses must be
generated as a result of this information to mitigate
disease risk.
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